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A General Equilibrium Model of Value Added Tax Evasion: An Application 
to Pakistan 





Value added taxes (VAT) constitute a major share of tax revenues in developing countries in 
which tax evasion is widespread. The literature on VAT evasion, however, is limited. This paper 
develops a computable general equilibrium framework for analyzing endogenous VAT tax 
evasion. The analytical framework entails increasing enforcement through greater spending on 
the enforcement of tax revenue collection. We assume that there is an elasticity that connects 
the changes in enforcement to actual increases in VAT collection. We apply the model to 
Pakistan data and show the level of enforcement spending required to achieve certain VAT 
collection targets. We also examine the short-, medium-, and long-term macroeconomic 
outlooks, and real consumption distribution across household economic groups associated with 
higher enforcement spending. We calibrate the model using 2016 as the base year and then run 
the dynamic model forward for 20 years. We define the implicit VAT rate as that hypothetical 
statutory rate that, in the absence of evasion, would approximately generate the observed VAT 
collection. We assume zero additional spending on enforcement in the baseline and estimate 
two alternative scenarios of VAT revenue target of 8% and 15% of the GDP. The alternative 
scenarios require increase in enforcement spending by a compounded 46.4% and 322.4%, 
respectively. We find that the increased enforcement spending enhances the sustainability of 
the government’s budget deficit without causing a decline in real GDP over the long-term. The 
interest and inflation rates are also lowered. However, there is a small regressive impact on 
households’ real consumption. 
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Low tax revenue collection is an inherent feature of many developing countries (Besley 
and Persson, 2014). The size of the informal sector as share of GDP in these countries is also 
very high (Schneider, 2002). In addition to the lower tax base due to a larger informal sector, tax 
evasion is a severe problem for developing countries. Higher tax evasion results in lower funds 
for public sector investment, which limits opportunities for human development and economic 
growth. Value added taxes (VAT) constitute a major share of tax revenues in many of these 
countries. The literature on tax evasion, however, mainly focuses on income and corporate taxes 
and rarely covers VAT evasion. Although a recent paper modeled consumption tax evasion in an 
optimal tax policy setting under a neoclassical framework (Economides et al., 2020), the 
literature on sales tax or VAT evasion is generally limited. We intend to address this gap by 
developing a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for analyzing the incidence of VAT 
evasion and applying it to data from a developing country.  
The tax performance of a country is closely tied with enforcement. Lack of information 
and imperfectly observed transactions are the operational bottlenecks of enforcement that lead to 
VAT evasion. True reporting, verified documents, and strict enforcement rules are, therefore, 
essential to lessen tax evasion (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006; Kleven et al., 2011). Strengthening 
enforcement to achieve the desired level of tax collection also involves adequate spending. 
Theoretically, an optimal tax administration should incorporate an enforcement budget such that 
the social benefit is equal to the social cost. However, in practice, the optimal level of 
administrative effort has almost always been less than the level that generates maximum revenue 
(Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002).  
A long strand of literature examines the social cost of increasing enforcement budgets in 





analyzing the impact of investment on enforcement activities in the USA have identified 
significant revenue potential in the range of USD one trillion over a decade (Sarin and Summers, 
2019; Rossotti, 2020). Engel et al. (2006) estimated that each dollar of increase in enforcement 
spending could increase VAT revenues in Chile by $31. Another strand of studies has focused on 
the optimal enforcement mechanism (Graetz et al., 1986; Sansing, 1993). Alm and Mckee (2004) 
showing that in the auditing process, unofficial communication has a more substantial effect on 
tax compliance than official communication. For emerging and low-income countries, Akitoby et 
al. (2018) found that multidimensional tax administrative reforms such as risk-based audits, 
registration, filing, payment, and reporting will work better with indirect taxes. Also, empirical 
evidence shows that strengthening the auditing and enforcement capacity is the key to significant 
tax collection in developing countries (Carrillo et al., 2017). 
We build on these findings that increasing VAT revenue entails larger enforcement 
spending. We apply data from Pakistan, a lower-middle-income country that, like many other 
developing countries, heavily relies on sales taxes (VAT) for fiscal revenues. We contribute to the 
literature by showing the level of enforcement spending required to achieve certain indirect tax 
(VAT) collection targets in a developing country setting. Further, we illustrate how the scenarios 
of higher enforcement spending leading to conclusions about how desired levels of VAT 
collection are associated with short-, medium-, and long-term macroeconomic outlooks and real 
consumption distributions across household economic groups. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study that entails a general equilibrium framework to analyze endogenous VAT 
evasion and enforcement and generates evidence on the economic consequences of enforcing 
VAT compliance through higher enforcement spending. In the following sections of the paper we 





simulation results from alternative enforcement scenarios. 
2. Evidence on VAT Evasion 
Several countries, including Pakistan, have adopted the VAT, which is believed to 
facilitate tax enforcement through a built-in incentive structure (Agha and Haughton, 1996; 
Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006). Early research on VAT efficiency was mostly focused on the tax 
rate and tax base. Bogetic and Hassan (1993) argued that more complexity and narrower bases 
were responsible for lower tax collection efficiency. Jack (1996) compares several Central and 
Eastern European nations in terms of VAT adoption, noting that tax administration and evasion 
must be studied with tax structure to determine tax efficiency. Keen and Smith (2006) explores 
several avenues of VAT noncompliance, outlining the administrative difficulties associated with 
VAT fraud and evasion. 
Another strand of literature examines the changes in tax policies accommodating VAT 
and how those changes are related to tax administration quality. Bird and Gendron (2006) 
considers tax administration quality and changes in tax policy in Ukraine and finds a positive 
relationship between higher administrative quality and tax collection efficiency. Similarly, Agha 
and Haughton (1996) find that administrative resources can increase tax collections. Pinhanez 
(2008) reports administrative reforms having a significant effect on VAT revenue growth in 
Brazil. Bergman and Nevarez (2006), however, document a mixed effect of audits on VAT 
compliance in Argentina and Chile. In a more recent study, Das-Gupta et al. (2016) construct tax 
administration measures of effectiveness from external audits of VAT administrations of India’s 
state governments and find a significantly large effect of tax administration effectiveness on tax 
revenues. 





administration increases tax evasion, and a higher level of evasion creates a culture of corruption, 
especially for developing countries. Previous literature also focuses on the VAT gap in several 
countries. Aguirre and Shome (1988) estimate the potential VAT revenue before and after the 
restructuring of the VAT rate structure in Mexico, suggesting a tax gap of 45.1% in 1980 and 
48.3% in 1983. Le Minh (2007) estimates a tax gap of 45.6 percent of the revenue potential for 
Romania. Jenkins and Kuo (2002) estimate the tax gap of 6 percent for alcoholic beverages, 10 
percent for tobacco products, and 48 percent for remaining commodities for Nepal. 
In summary, there is a sizable body of evidence regarding tax administration methods, tax 
gap, and low quality of tax administration. The research relies on different periods, different 
countries, and various measures of effectiveness and methodologies. However, these studies 
barely address the fiscal spending that is required to enhance enforcement and reduce VAT 
evasion, particularly in a general equilibrium setting. To this end, our study intends to fill this 
gap in literature by incorporating a general equilibrium framework where spending on 
enforcement enhances VAT collection. 
3. Pakistan’s Context 
Pakistan is a lower-middle-income country in South Asia with a historically low tax-to-
GDP ratio. Since 2000, the average tax-to-GDP ratio was around 10%, which improved slightly 
in recent years (Figure 1a). Despite efforts to improve tax collection, Pakistan runs a persistent 
budget deficit of over 5% of GDP. The tax structure is predominantly inclined toward indirect 
taxes including sales tax (VAT), excise tax, import duty, and other taxes. Among indirect taxes, 
the major share of revenue comes from the sales tax (Figure 1b). Because of such reliance, 






Figure 1: Pakistan’s Tax Structure 
 
a. Tax-to-GDP Ratio b. Share of Taxes in Total Tax Revenue 
 
 
c. Revenue Spending d. Revenue Spending Elasticity 
  
 
Tax evasion is an inherent problem of the Pakistan economy. A recent study indicates that 
Pakistan has the potential to nearly double its tax revenue as share of GDP (Cevik, 2018). 
However, because of tax evasion and avoidance, Pakistan’s tax collection remains lower than in 
comparator countries. A World Bank project information document states that the tax gap for 
sales tax (VAT) in Pakistan is around 67% (World Bank, 2019). VAT evasion, thus, is a real 
concern in the Pakistan context. Previous studies on Pakistan mostly emphasize the efficiency 
and responsiveness of VAT or sales tax revenue mobilization in response to growth. Examining 
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04, Bilqees (2004) reported a better performance of the sales tax in terms of revenue generation 
despite an overall smaller (less than unity) total tax revenue to total GDP elasticity. With respect 
to enforcement and tax administration, Illizetzki and Lagakos (2017) argued that improved tax 
administration in Pakistan could increase tax revenue by almost 8 percent, though the increased 
tax rate might adversely affect GDP and increase the rate of informality. 
Cevik (2018) estimates the short-run and long-run elasticities of tax revenue with respect 
to GDP over the period 1960-2015 and reports significant variations across various subcategories 
of tax revenue. The study also finds that the general sales tax revenue is more responsive to GDP, 
though in comparison to other developing countries, Pakistan’s tax revenue elasticity with 
respect to GDP has been below par. Elasticity estimates with respect to revenue collection 
expenditure in Pakistan, however, is not available in the literature. Pakistan spends around 0.4% 
of its total current expenditure for enforcement of tax collection (Figure 1c). We estimated a 
revenue enforcement spending elasticity (i.e., elasticity of tax revenue with respect to revenue 
collection spending) of 1.267 for Pakistan during the period 2008-09 to 2019-20 (Figure 1d).  
4. Model 
We develop the formal structure of a dynamic general equilibrium model that 
endogenously generates an underground economy. 1 Much of the structure of our model is 
designed to permit numerical implementation for Pakistan. Our model has n discrete time 
periods. All agents optimize in each period over a 2-period time horizon. That is, in period t  they 
optimize given prices for periods t  and 1t + and optimize expectations for prices for the future 
after 1t + . When period 2t +  arrives, agents re-optimize for period 2t +  and 3t + , based on 
new information about period 2t + . The consumers in the model maximize inter-temporal utility 
 
1 Part of this section, covering the corporate income tax, is based upon Feltenstein et al. (2017), as well as 





functions. There are 18 consumer groups and we assume Cobb-Douglas utility functions for each 
category with utility weights derived from the Pakistan social accounting matrix consumption 
data. The government in the model collects direct and indirect taxes and provides public goods, 
public infrastructure, and subsidies.  
4.1 Production 
There are 8 factors of production: five types of capital corresponding to five aggregate 
nonagricultural productive sectors – light manufacturing, heavy industry, utility (electric, water, 
sewage), transport, and hotels, housing, health services. There are also 3 additional factors of 
production. These are urban labor, rural labor, and land. Finally, there are three types of financial 
assets: domestic currency, bank deposits, and foreign currency. An input-output matrix, At, is 
used to determine intermediate and final production in period t. The matrix is 50 x 50, and is 
taken from Samwalk (2010), a 2007 social accounting matrix developed for Pakistan by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (see Debowicz et al., 2013 for details). The first 50 
rows and columns of the input-output matrix correspond to domestic production. The final row 
and column represents imports of intermediate and final goods, which are treated as a single 
aggregate commodity.2 Corresponding to each sector in the input-output matrix, sector-specific 
value added figures are produced using capital and urban labor for the nonagricultural sectors, 
and land and rural labor in agriculture. 
The specific formulation of the firm's problem is as follows. Let jKiy ,
j
Liy be the inputs of 
capital and urban labor to the jth nonagricultural sector in period i. Let GiY be the outstanding 
stock of government infrastructure in period i. The production of value added in sector j in period 
 
2 Given the available data, that is, the structure of the input-output matrix, we are required to treat imports as an 
aggregate commodity, rather than having disaggregated imports that compete with domestic production sectors. It is 
possible that this simplification might have an effect on poverty levels of certain consumer groups, although it would 





i is then given by: 
 ( , , ) j jji ji Ki Li Giva va y y Y=   (1) 
where we suppose that public infrastructure may act as a productivity increment to 
private production. Sector j pays income taxes on inputs of capital and labor, given by ,  Kij Lijt t  
respectively, in period i. The interpretation of these taxes is that the capital tax is a tax on firm 
profits, while the labor tax is a personal income tax that is withheld at source. There are no pure 
profits here, since production functions are constant returns to scale, and hence the corporate 
income tax is treated as a tax on returns to capital.  
We suppose that each type of sectoral capital is produced via a sector-specific investment 
technology that uses inputs of capital and labor to produce new capital. Investment is carried out 
by the private sector and is entirely financed by domestic borrowing. Clearly this is a 
simplification of the investment process, in that we are excluding investment financed by foreign 
direct investment (FDI) as well as reinvested profits. Since production is constant returns to 
scale, there are no pure profits to reinvest. In addition, we wish to avoid the complexities of 
introducing a theory of FDI into the model. Since the model does track the macro outcomes of 
the historical Pakistan economy, we would claim that we are not losing a significant amount of 
detail by our simplification. Let us define the following notation: 
HiC  = The cost of producing the quantity H of capital of a particular type in period i.  
ir  = The interest rate in period i. 
KiP = The return to capital in period i. 
MiP  = The price of money in period i.  
iδ = The rate of depreciation of capital. 
 





minimizing cost of producing the quantity of capital, 1H , then the cost of borrowing must equal 



























    (2) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 is the interest rate in period j, given by:
1/j Bjr P= , and 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 is the price of a bond 
in period j. The tax on capital is implicitly included in the investment problem, as capital taxes 
are paid on capital as an input to production.  
4.2 Evasion of the Corporate Income Tax 
The decision to invest depends not only on the variables in the above equation, but also 
upon the decision the firm makes as to whether it should pay taxes. This decision determines the 
firm’s entry into the underground economy. We assume that the firm’s decision is based upon a 
comparison of the tax rate on capital with the rate of return on new capital. Formally, suppose 










that is, the present value of the return on one unit of new capital is greater than the 
current tax rate on capital. In this case we assume the investor pays the full tax rate on capital 










Here the discounted rate of return is less than the tax rate. The extent to which the firm 
goes into the underground economy is determined by the gap between the tax rate and the rate of 




















  −  +  = −
  
    
  (3) 







 reflects the share of the sector that operates in the above ground economy. Hence 
α  represents a firm-specific behavioral variable. An “honest” firm would set 0α = , while a 
firm that is prone to evasion would have a high value for α .  
4.3 Banking 
We will suppose that there is one bank for each nonagricultural sector of the economy. 
There are 5 such sectors, and hence 5 banks, corresponding to each of the aggregate capital 
stocks. Each bank lends primarily to the sector with which it is associated. The banks are, 
however, not fully specialized in the sector they correspond to. We make the simplifying 
assumption that each bank holds a fixed share of the outstanding debt of its particular sector. It 
then holds additional fixed shares of the debt of each of the remaining sectors. We make this 
assumption of diversification of assets in order to allow for a situation in which a firm that 
evades taxes, and thereby enters the underground economy, might receive varying degrees of 
credit rationing from the different banks to which it applies for loans. 
Our premise is that banks have no direct way of knowing whether specific firms operate 
in the underground economy. We assume that banks only care about the amount of capital that 
they estimate the firm may have. If the firm defaults on its loan, then this represents the best 
estimate of the amount that the bank could seize. The bank would, presumably, be willing to lend 
an amount equal to at least the estimated firm capital.  





loan. There is a single, flat corporate tax rate that the borrowing firm faces. Hence, suppose that 
1KT  represents taxes actually paid by the borrower in period 1. This is known to the bank, as the 
potential borrower is required to present his tax returns. Thus if the borrower fully complied with 
his tax obligation, and hence carried out no underground activity, the value of his capital, 1K̂  , 








In this case the bank lends an amount 1L , where 1 1HL C< , as the bank would not be able to 
seize the full value of the loan in the case of a default. The situation we have described would, in 
the case of perfect certainty, have credit rationing when the estimated value of the firm’s capital 
is less than its loan request. If the firm’s capital is greater than its loan request, there would be no 
credit rationing. 
In a more realistic case of uncertainty about both the true value of the firm, as well as 
about the bank’s own ability to seize the firm, one might expect the lending process to be 
somewhat different. Accordingly, we will suppose that a simple functional form determines bank 
lending as a function of the amount requested as well as the estimated value of the firm’s capital. 
We define the amount the bank lends, 1L , as:   















Hereγ  represents a measure of risk aversion by the bank. If 0γ = , there are no credit 
restrictions, and the bank ignores estimates of the borrower’s estimated net worth. As γ  rises, 
the bank increasingly restricts lending if the term in brackets is less than 1. Thus, if a firm 





investment. If banks are highly risk averse, they will never lend more than a firm’s estimated net 
worth, which is based on its tax return. This tax return therefore represents all the information the 
bank needs in order to determine its response to a request for a loan. 
4.4 Evasion of Value Added Tax – Enforcement Spending Mechanism 
 
Note that in developing our model of corporate income tax evasion, there is no notion of 
enforcement. Rather, the corporation pays taxes based on its need to access the loans from the 
banking system. In the case of evasion of the VAT, we take a different approach. Here we 
suppose that the retail firm pays the VAT based upon the statutory tax rate and the probability of 
detection if it evades the tax. This approach is based loosely on Allingham and Sandmo (1972). 
We do not have a direct measure of the probability of detection. Rather, we use the level of 
expenditure on enforcement as a proxy for the probability of being detected. 
The government spends (current spending) on enforcement that enhances collection. It 
has a target for VAT taxes as a percentage of nominal GNP, 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖) in each period 𝑖𝑖. The 
CGE model is continuously calculating VAT tax revenue in each period, 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖) as well as 
𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖). There are 20 time periods in the current simulations, so let us designate the number of 
time periods as 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 20. We specify an adjustment rule for spending on enforcement. We 
define 𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖) as the gap between the target VAT revenue share and the actual collection share, 
normalized by the target share. More formally: 
𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖) =




This functional form of adjustment is arbitrary and we could use almost any continuous 
function. For now, we will suppose the increase in spending is a linear function of the tax gap, 





tax collection enforcement. Thus, for example, if 𝛾𝛾 = 1 and if 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖) = 0 then there will be a 
100% increase in enforcement spending. If, on the other hand, VAT tax revenues as a share of 
GDP are equal or greater than the target, then the enforcement spending increase is 0.  
We assume that there is an estimated elasticity that connects the changes in enforcement 
to actual increases in tax collection. The change in tax collection may be viewed as changing the 
effective tax rate: the rate the consumer pays. Let the elasticity of tax collection with respect to 
changes in enforcement spending be denoted by ε. Then the relationship is linear and takes the 
following form: 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶(𝐽𝐽)� = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶(𝐽𝐽) ∗ �1.0 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝛾𝛾 ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖)� 
 
To clarify, 𝛾𝛾 ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖) represents the percentage change in overall enforcement 
spending given the tax gap 𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖). The term 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 is the 𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ sector’s elasticity of tax collection 
with respect to the change in enforcement spending. Thus 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝛾𝛾 ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉(𝑖𝑖) represents the 𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ 
sector’s percentage change in tax collection. Hence 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶(𝐽𝐽) �  in the above equation is the new VAT 
collection from sector 𝑗𝑗 .  
Intuitively, the implicit VAT rates, what people are actually paying, are changing 
endogenously in the CGE model solution. The elasticities 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 needs to be estimated with real data. 
There could be a single uniform elasticity, or sector by sector estimates based upon compliance 
behavior across sectors. Some sectors may be more honest, while others may be more risk 
averse, based upon fears of apprehension.3  
5. Simulation 
We carry out a series of simulations that illustrate how our model can be used to analyze 
 
3 We do not explicitly, model risk of apprehension, as in, for example, Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Such risk could 





alternative policies. Accordingly, we first calibrate a numerical version of our model to recent 
Pakistan data, so that the model can be claimed to be useful in analyzing alternative tax policies. 
Suppose then that we take a particular year as the base for going forward. We then run the 
dynamic model forward and see how well it replicates a few years of real economic fiscal data. 
The alternative scenarios we consider are – VAT revenues are targeted to be 8% and 15% of the 
GDP respectively. 
We use 2016 as a base year to begin the model’s 20 year forward looking simulation. 
Here we assume that the government is indifferent to increasing tax collection and thus does not 
undertake additional spending on enforcement. We define the implicit VAT rate as that 
hypothetical statutory rate that, in the absence of evasion, would approximately generate the 
observed VAT collection. In this case, this is 6%. In fact, the statutory VAT rate is 16%, on 
average. We are also combining VAT with import duties, which are about 14% of indirect tax 
revenues, and excises to generate a single measure of indirect taxes, so as to correspond to real 
data.4 
In the base simulation, indirect taxes in 2016 were 6.21% of GDP, while the sum of sales, 
excise, and import taxes was 6.63% of GDP in the real data. Over the 3-year period 2016 – 2018 
the average indirect tax share of GDP in the base simulation is 6.46%, while the average using 
real data is 6.55. Thus, we would claim that our model, using estimated parameters and this 
implicit tax rate, gives a good approximation of the performance of VAT over the first 3 years of 
the simulation. Over the same time period, the actual Pakistan data shows total taxes were, on 
average, 12.64% of GDP while in the simulation they were 14.14% of GDP. We slightly 
overestimate direct tax collections in the simulation. Recall that our methodology for generating 
 





evasion of corporate income taxes is based on tax compliance being tied to the need to receive 
bank loans. We may well underestimate evasion from the corporate income tax. Finally, we 
assume full compliance with the personal income tax, treating it as a payroll tax withheld at the 
source. Admittedly, this is a major omission, but we are not attempting to incorporate all possible 
types of tax evasion. 
 In the first counterfactual simulation, we suppose that the government is not 
satisfied with VAT taxes only averaging about 6.5% of GDP (baseline estimate). Accordingly, we 
will have the government wish to generate a VAT tax rate that will deliver total VAT revenue 
equaling about 8% of GDP. We consider a single uniform elasticity of 1.3, based upon our 
estimated elasticity of 1.267 using Pakistan fiscal data. Raising VAT revenues from 6.46% of 
GDP to about 8% of GDP requires a 22.3% increase in enforcement spending in the first year, 
and a further 19.7% increase in the 2nd year. Hence there is an almost 50% increase in 
enforcement spending over 2 years required to improve VAT revenues by about 1.5 percentage 
points of GDP. 
 In the second counterfactual simulation, we analyze the scenario to bring VAT 
revenues up to approximately 15% of GDP. Given the set of statutory VAT rates for all sectors in 
the economy and the observed real-world level of collection (about 6.5% of GDP), we need to 
determine how much more needs to be spent on increased enforcement to achieve a higher 
collection as a share of GDP. It appears that increasing enforcement spending by a compounded 
322.4% would lead to the desired outcome in the second counterfactual simulation. This increase 
in spending takes place over the first 5 years of the simulation, unlike the previous, less 
ambitious increase which is carried out over the first 2 years. Clearly this is an enormous 





elasticity remains constant as tax enforcement rises so much. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see 
the macro implications of such a collection measure. 
We report and compare the fiscal outlook including indirect taxes, direct taxes, total 
taxes, expenditure, and budget deficit; macroeconomic outlook including real GDP growth, 
interest rate, and inflation; and change in real income across different household categories for 
the base and two alternative simulations over short-, medium-, and long-term. We provide results 
for the estimated elasticity of 1.3 and a higher elasticity of 1.5, which entails a relatively lower 
increase in enforcement spending for respective targets. 
6. Results 
Table 1 shows the fiscal outlooks under alternative scenarios. The share of indirect taxes 
as percentage of GNP is around 6.5% in the base case, which we intend to change to 8% and 
15% respectively in the alternative scenarios. After increasing the enforcement spending that is 
required to achieve the target level of indirect VAT revenue, we do not observe any significant 
changes in the direct tax revenue collection. It remains around 7.5% of the GDP across all 
simulations (base and alternate). Having the share of direct taxes unchanged, and an increase in 
the share of indirect taxes in the alternate cases the tax to GDP ratio increases from around 14% 
in the base case to around 16% and 21% respectively in the two alternate cases. As a result, 
budget deficit decreases by around one to five percentage points in respective cases. However, to 
achieve the five percentage point reduction, it would require an exorbitantly high enforcement 
spending which may not be deemed feasible under the status quo. All the fiscal indicators are a 







Table 1. Fiscal Outlook 
 
 Elasticity = 1.3 Elasticity = 1.5 
 5-years 10-years 15-years 20-years 5-years 10-years 15-years 20-years 
 (% of GNP) (% of GNP) 
Indirect Tax         
Baseline 6.47 6.51 6.51 6.51 6.47 6.51 6.51 6.51 
8%-target 7.46 7.85 7.97 8.01 7.62 8.06 8.19 8.24 
15%-target 9.77 12.49 13.33 13.74 10.21 13.05 13.89 14.25 
         
Direct Tax         
Baseline 7.70 7.41 7.60 7.64 7.70 7.41 7.60 7.64 
8%-target 7.73 7.39 7.58 7.63 7.73 7.38 7.56 7.63 
15%-target 7.81 7.36 7.39 7.54 7.67 7.25 7.27 7.45 
         
Total Tax         
Baseline 14.17 13.93 14.12 14.14 14.17 13.93 14.12 14.14 
8%-target 15.20 15.25 15.55 15.64 15.35 15.44 15.76 15.87 
15%-target 17.58 19.85 20.72 21.29 17.89 20.30 21.16 21.71 
         
Expenditure         
Baseline 27.59 28.21 28.82 29.55 27.59 28.21 28.82 29.55 
8%-target 28.29 28.83 29.36 30.07 28.34 28.88 29.39 30.06 
15% 29.93 31.19 31.47 31.86 30.07 31.27 31.45 31.75 
         
Deficit         
Baseline -13.42 -14.28 -14.70 -15.40 -13.42 -14.28 -14.70 -15.40 
8%-target -13.09 -13.58 -13.81 -14.42 -12.99 -13.44 -13.63 -14.19 
15%-target -12.35 -11.34 -10.75 -10.58 -12.19 -10.97 -10.29 -10.04 
 
The macroeconomic outlooks associated with different scenarios are presented in Table 2. 
The compound rate of growth of real GDP does not change at all between the base case and 
15%-target scenarios over the 20-year period. Nonetheless, we would claim that the fact that real 
growth remains constant while fiscal tightening is being implemented is a positive sign. There 
was a slight decrease in the real GDP growth rates in the 8%-target scenario. However, for 1.5 
elasticity, the long-term growth rate is a little higher. The interest rate slightly declines in the 8%-
target scenario, while a larger decrease is observed in the 15%-target scenario. Finally, the fiscal 





Table 2. Macroeconomic Outlook 
 
 Elasticity = 1.3 Elasticity = 1.5 
 5-years 10-years 15-years 20-years 5-years 10-years 15-years 20-years 
 (%) (%) 
Real GDP Growth         
Baseline 2.19 3.70 4.23 4.67 2.19 3.70 4.23 4.67 
8%-target 2.21 3.69 4.23 4.55 2.19 3.66 4.23 4.67 
15%-target 3.59 3.62 4.25 4.66 3.32 3.61 4.25 4.74 
         
Interest Rate         
Baseline 10.95 10.34 9.89 10.01 10.95 10.34 9.89 10.01 
8%-target 10.87 10.29 9.77 9.91 10.79 9.96 9.47 9.73 
15%-target 11.04 9.98 8.99 8.93 10.90 9.65 8.58 8.54 
         
Inflation Rate         
Baseline 20.21 19.18 19.41 19.66 20.21 19.18 19.41 19.66 
8%-target 19.15 17.89 17.98 18.46 18.84 17.63 17.67 18.12 
15%-target 16.54 14.37 13.45 13.88 15.51 13.46 12.73 13.28 
 
Real consumption can serve as a measure of welfare. Table 3 presents the changes in the 
distribution of real consumption across different household groups for the 1.3 elasticity. The real 
consumption for all urban households and rural non-farm poor households (quintile 1 and 
quintile 2) increase in both alternate simulations. For all other households, real consumption 
decreases in the alternate scenarios. The medium-farm households suffer the largest loss, 
followed by non-farm non-poor households, small-farm households, landless farmer households, 
and waged-landless farmer households. The estimates for the 1.5 elasticity are presented in Table 









Table 3. Change in Aggregate Real Consumption Compared to Baseline (Elasticity = 1.3) 
 
 8%-target 15%-target 
  5-years 10-years 15-years 20-years 5-years 10-years 15-years 20-years 
 (%) (%) 
Urban households        
Quintile 1 2.14 1.54 1.10 0.71 7.21 6.50 4.32 2.71 
Quintile 2 2.51 1.56 1.04 0.64 8.60 6.80 4.15 2.45 
Other 2.34 1.58 1.09 0.70 7.97 6.77 4.34 2.68 
Rural households        
Medium Farm        
Sindh -2.23 -2.44 -2.07 -1.88 -6.87 -9.54 -9.31 -8.96 
Punjab -1.20 -1.80 -1.72 -1.66 -3.75 -7.17 -7.86 -8.05 
Other Pakistan -1.00 -1.64 -1.61 -1.59 -3.12 -6.55 -7.42 -7.75 
Small Farm        
Sindh -0.89 -1.55 -1.54 -1.53 -2.72 -6.14 -7.09 -7.46 
Punjab -0.67 -1.37 -1.39 -1.40 -1.91 -5.32 -6.39 -6.84 
Other Pakistan -0.54 -1.28 -1.32 -1.34 -1.42 -4.90 -6.06 -6.53 
Landless Farmer        
Sindh -0.33 -1.01 -1.17 -1.28 -1.03 -4.12 -5.58 -6.39 
Punjab -0.11 -0.80 -0.99 -1.13 -0.27 -3.23 -4.80 -5.70 
Other Pakistan 0.11 -0.59 -0.83 -0.99 0.44 -2.38 -4.07 -5.08 
Waged Landless 
Farmer       
Sindh 1.21 0.37 0.00 -0.28 4.24 1.78 -0.42 -1.78 
Punjab 1.47 0.78 0.38 0.05 4.99 3.35 1.17 -0.34 
Other Pakistan 1.18 0.28 -0.09 -0.36 4.15 1.44 -0.79 -2.12 
Non-farm        
Quintile 1 2.44 1.36 0.83 0.44 8.41 6.03 3.26 1.56 
Quintile 2 2.55 1.47 0.95 0.56 8.79 6.47 3.82 2.15 


















Table 4. Change in Aggregate Real Consumption Compared to Baseline (Elasticity = 1.5) 
 
 8%-target 15%-target 
  5-years 10-years 15-years 20-years 5-years 10-years 15-years 20-years 
 (%) (%) 
Urban households        
Quintile 1 2.06 1.42 0.98 0.70 6.73 5.63 3.54 2.13 
Quintile 2 2.39 1.40 0.88 0.61 7.96 5.74 3.24 1.79 
Other 2.24 1.44 0.96 0.68 7.41 5.80 3.50 2.07 
Rural households        
Medium Farm        
Sindh -2.52 -2.86 -2.51 -2.18 -7.44 -10.43 -10.37 -9.92 
Punjab -1.38 -2.13 -2.09 -1.94 -4.14 -7.88 -8.79 -8.93 
Other Pakistan -1.16 -1.95 -1.97 -1.86 -3.49 -7.23 -8.33 -8.60 
Small Farm        
Sindh -1.06 -1.86 -1.90 -1.79 -3.12 -6.86 -8.01 -8.32 
Punjab -0.85 -1.70 -1.75 -1.65 -2.37 -6.12 -7.35 -7.71 
Other Pakistan -0.73 -1.61 -1.67 -1.58 -1.95 -5.76 -7.05 -7.41 
Landless Farmer        
Sindh -0.44 -1.24 -1.47 -1.51 -1.33 -4.69 -6.36 -7.16 
Punjab -0.22 -1.04 -1.29 -1.34 -0.60 -3.85 -5.61 -6.47 
Other Pakistan 0.00 -0.82 -1.11 -1.19 0.09 -3.02 -4.88 -5.83 
Waged Landless 
Farmer 
      
Sindh 1.09 0.15 -0.24 -0.41 3.73 0.92 -1.30 -2.51 
Punjab 1.37 0.62 0.19 -0.04 4.53 2.55 0.37 -1.00 
Other Pakistan 1.04 0.04 -0.35 -0.50 3.61 0.54 -1.71 -2.88 
Non-farm        
Quintile 1 2.29 1.17 0.64 0.38 7.72 4.92 2.29 0.86 
Quintile 2 2.41 1.28 0.78 0.52 8.10 5.37 2.88 1.48 
Other -1.43 -2.01 -1.89 -1.74 -4.29 -7.48 -7.95 -8.02 
 
The urban sectors gain income primarily because the increased in VAT collection lowers 
the tax burden on capital (the corporate income tax) and therefore makes capital holders richer. 
The lower interest rates generated by higher VAT collections, and lower deficits, generate similar 
outcomes and point to the importance of using a general equilibrium methodology. The lowest 
non-farm rural sectors have a similar small increase in real consumption. The reason for this is 





increases as are the other rural sectors, possibly because their consumption comes partially from 
their own stores’ stocks. On the other hand, the highest income rural non-farm cohort does suffer 
a consumption loss. We attribute this to the fact that retail store ownership, which belongs to the 
high income rural non-farm cohort, experiences a decline in sales and income under the higher 
VAT collections. 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
In our computable general equilibrium analysis, we generate alternate scenarios of higher 
VAT collection. Direct taxes as a share of GDP remains essentially unchanged between the base 
and the two alternate simulations. As a result, there has been an approximately 1.5 percentage 
point and 7.1 percentage points improvement in the share total share of tax revenues in GDP 
respectively in the 8%- and 15%-target scenarios. Note that we are not specifying how the 
increased revenue might be spent. Rather we assume it is used entirely for deficit reduction. 
Interestingly, the share of public expenditure in GDP rises only slightly in the 8%-target 
simulation and around 2 percentage points in the 15%-target simulation, as compared with the 
do-nothing base case. One might expect that the increase in enforcement spending would lead to 
a significant increase in public spending, but there is a countervailing decline in the interest rate 
which reduces spending on public debt.  
We find that the interest rate in the 15%-target scenario drops significantly, and as a 
result, average public spending increases by only about 2.3% of GNP despite the huge increase 
in enforcement spending. Although not shown in the Table 2, private consumption actually 
declines. The average inflation rates drop considerably as a result of the VAT increases and 
resulting declines in consumption. 





enhance the sustainability of the government’s budget deficit without causing a decline in real 
GDP over the 20 periods of the simulation. A recent cross-country study finds that increased tax 
enforcement measures adversely impact economic growth, while higher tax revenue collection 
promotes growth (McClellan, 2018). Our growth results may be attributable to a combination of 
these two impacts. Interest and inflation rates are also lowered, so from a general macro-
economic perspective the reforms seem to be beneficial. On the other hand, there is a small but 
significant regressive impact on real consumption for the rural sector, which is very large in 
Pakistan. On the other hand, the urban sector’s consumption benefits slightly over time. This 
change is primarily caused by a data issue. Namely, the Pakistan SAM attributes almost all 
capital ownership to the urban consumers. Since the return to capital improves as a result of the 
shift in the tax burden to consumption (the VAT), capital owners also experience an income and 
hence consumption increase.  
Pakistan, as many other developing countries, appears to have been stuck in a suboptimal 
political economy equilibrium with a lower tax to GDP ratio. The low tax performance can be 
linked to types of societal institutions and to the level of corruption in the tax administration 
(Bird et al., 2014). The corrupt practices pervade the tax system through different channels 
involving policy makers, tax collectors, taxpayers, and the general public. In this paper, we, 
however, do not explore the political economy of tax evasion in Pakistan. Rather, we mainly 
focus on the enforcement spending required to achieve a revenue target given the status quo 
societal institutions and degree of corruption. Were there better institutions or less corruption, the 
elasticity might be greater and the required spending could be smaller. We do not analyze how to 
develop better institutions or how to curb corruption, which are a different set of issues. We 
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